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In Smith v. Van Gorkom,1 the Delaware Supreme Court held that the
directors of Trans Union Corporation breached their fiduciary duty of
care by approving a merger without adequate information on the fairness
of the offered price of $55 per share.' Trans Union's directors, who relied
solely on their chairman for the valuation of the transaction,' did not fol-
low the common practice of asking an investment banker to render a fair-
ness opinion. 4 The court suggested that, although fairness opinions were
not required by law, the directors could have exercised an informed busi-
ness judgment by obtaining such an opinion.5 As one of the few cases
imposing personal liability on the reputable directors of a major corpora-
l. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
2. Id. at 874. The existence of a substantial premium over market value, without more informa-
tion, did not provide an adequate basis for approving the transaction. Id. at 869 n.9 (offered price
represented premium of 62% over average of Trans Union's high and low prices during previous nine
months, and premium of 48% over last closing price).
3. Id. at 876-77. At the time of the directors' decision, no formal analysis (either in-house or
outside) of Trans Union's value in an acquisition had been prepared. The chief financial officer's
brief oral statement to the directors regarding the feasibility of a leveraged buyout did not constitute
an adequate valuation study or "report" on which the directors could rely as defined by DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1983). Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875.
4. Directors ask investment bankers to render fairness opinions in a wide variety of corporate
control transactions. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d
Cir. 1986) (lock-up option); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980)
(tender offer); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (selective self-tender);
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (cashout merger); Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d
556 (Del. Ch. 1977) (share repurchase). For discussion of the role of fairness opinions in corporate
control transactions, see Chazen, Fairness From a Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public
Companies: Is "Third-Party Sale Value" the Appropriate Standard?, 36 Bus. LAW. 1439 (1981);
Feuerstein, Valuation and Fairness Opinions, 32 Bus. LAW. 1337 (1977).
5. 488 A.2d at 876.
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tion in the absence of fraud or wrongdoing,6 Van Gorkom has placed new
importance on obtaining fairness opinions.
7
A fairness opinion is a judgment by an investment banker as to the
financial fairness of the terms of a corporate control transaction.8 In the-
ory, such opinions should protect shareholder interests.9 Fairness opinions
have been criticized, however, as expensive rubber stamps that insulate
directors from liability.10 By hiring investment bankers, directors essen-
6. "The search for cases in which directors of industrial organizations have been held liable in
derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of
needles in a very large haystack." Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indem-
nification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968). Professor Bishop
found only four such cases. Id. at 1099-1100. The American Law Institute draft report on corporate
governance added only two cases to this list. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUC-
TURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01, at n.17 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985).
7. See Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437,
1453 (1985) ("most immediate effect of [Van Gorkom] will be that no firm considering a fundamental
corporate change will do so without obtaining a fairness letter or other similar documentation from
outside consultants"). Commentators have been critical of the Van Gorkom decision. See, e.g., Herzel
& Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAw. 1187
(1986); Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41
Bus. LAW. 1 (1985). Professor Fischel has argued:
Shareholders are the biggest losers after [Van Gorkom]. Firms will have no difficulty finding
an "expert" who is willing to state that a price at a significant premium over the market price
in an arm's length transaction is "fair."... [T]he cost of obtaining such an opinion is, in
effect, a judicially imposed tax on fundamental corporate changes. The inevitable consequence
will be that fewer transactions will occur and that when they do occur, returns to investors will
be lower.
Fischel, supra, at 1453.
8. The following is an example of a fairness opinion:
You have asked Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb Incorporated to give its opinion with respect
to the proposed tender offer for all of the common shares of Rowan Companies, Inc.
("Rowan") at $26 per share.
In the time available to us, we have not had the opportunity to conduct a complete investiga-
tion of Rowan nor make any physical inspection of its facilities but we have been Rowan's
investment banker since 1967 and have detailed knowledge of Rowan. . . . We have recently
met with Rowan management . . . . We have reviewed certain available public information
concerning Rowan, the record of public trading of Rowan's stock as compared with companies
deemed comparable, and have made a general financial and statistical comparison of Rowan
with selected public companies in the same or similar businesses. In addition, we have re-
viewed the prices and premiums of selected cash tender offers, including recent acquisitions of
contract drilling companies. We think that our investigation is an adequate basis for our opin-
ion expressed below.
Based upon the procedures we have conducted to date and our experience as investment
bankers to the drilling industry, it is our opinion that the price of the proposed tender offer
does not adequately reflect the value of Rowan.
Letter from Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb Inc. to the Board of Directors of Rowan Companies, Inc.
(June 15, 1978), reprinted in 2 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS N-
10 (1978).
9. When rendering fairness opinions, investment bankers can serve as "gatekeepers." Gatekeepers
are third parties who can obstruct misconduct by withholding a specialized good or service. For dis-
cussion of the costs and benefits of gatekeeper liability, see Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies
and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984) [hereinafter Kraakman, Corporate Liabil-
ity Strategies]; Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986) [hereinafter Kraakman, Gatekeepers].
10. Former SEC Commissioner Bevis Longstreth argues that fairness opinions are often "boiler-
plated passkeys. . . effective in protecting a conflicted management from successful attack, but inade-
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tially can delegate their fiduciary duty of care to an outsider, who does not
owe the same duty to shareholders."1 As a result, directors may rely on
incomplete or misleading fairness opinions to pursue takeovers damaging
shareholders' interests or to oppose transactions benefiting shareholders."2
The problem, simply put, is that courts have neither closely examined
directors' reliance on fairness opinions nor held investment bankers liable
for negligence in rendering opinions.1"
This Note argues that properly conducted fairness opinions can reduce
opportunistic behavior by management 4 in corporate control transactions.
After describing fairness opinions and their current legal status, the Note
explains why fairness opinions sometimes do not serve shareholder inter-
ests. The Note then advocates (1) stricter judicial scrutiny of directors'
reliance on fairness opinions, and (2) judicial recognition of the duty of
investment bankers to act with care when rendering opinions. Finally, the
Note sets forth procedural standards that courts could apply to determine
whether directors or investment bankers have breached their respective
duties of care to a corporation or its shareholders.
I. THE PROBLEM
A. Background of Fairness Opinions
The heightened level of merger and acquisition activity over the past
ten years'5 has increased the role of investment bankers in corporate deci-
quate to give shareholders full value for their shares." Longstreth Says Federal, State Laws Are Not
Assuring Fairness in Buyouts, 15 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1908, 1909 (1983); see also Stein,
Investment Banking's Dirty Little Secret, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1986, § 3 (Business), at 2, col. 3
(fairness opinions are "deceit upon the investing public and upon the marketplace generally, and
certainly unworthy of institutions with serious national responsibilities and trust").
11. Courts have not found that an investment bank rendering a fairness opinion owes a fiduciary
duty to shareholders. See infra note 94. Courts have held, however, that directors can discharge their
fiduciary duty by hiring an investment banker. See infra note 74.
12. This problem is believed to be particularly acute in going-private transactions involving man-
agement. In 1983, for example, the management of Stokley-Van Camp proposed a cash buyout of all
public shareholders. Management offered $55 per share, along with a statement from an investment
bank that this price was "fair and attractive." Once management's offer became public, Quaker Oats
made a successful bid for $77 per share. This third party bid could not be blocked because manage-
ment controlled only 27% of Stokley's outstanding shares. Many going-private transactions, however,
succeed before third parties can make higher bids. See McGough, Fairness for Hire, FORBFS, July
29, 1985, at 52; Longstreth Says Federal, State Laws Are Not Assuring Fairness in Buyouts, supra
note 10, at 1909.
13. Directors have not been found personally liable for relying on a negligently prepared fairness
opinion. In a few cases, courts have enjoined the actions of directors relying on such opinions. See
infra notes 84-85. There are no reported cases in which investment bankers have been held liable for
negligence in the preparation of fairness opinions.
14. In this Note, "management" includes both inside (i.e., corporate officers who are also direc-
tors) and outside directors.
15. Although the number of mergers remained fairly constant from 1975 to 1985, the total dollar
value paid in that period increased from $14 billion to $180 billion. The number of $100 million
transactions rose from 14 to 270 during the same period; the number of $1 billion transactions in-
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sionmaking. Investment bankers identify acquisition candidates, provide
tactical advice to bidder and target firms, negotiate transactions, and pre-
pare valuations of companies involved in transactions. 6 Fairness opinions
are based on the results of such valuations. Typically, the investment
banker will provide both a short written opinion stating whether the
transaction is fair and more detailed statistical materials for use during
the bankers' oral presentation to the board of directors."
Firm valuation is essential in a transaction involving a closely held
company, or a division or unit of a publicly held company. Without a
large market for shares, investors need to construct a value for ownership
of such assets.' In the case of a publicly held company, however, capital
markets theory posits that the market price of shares is the "best" esti-
mate, given publicly available information, of their value.' 9 Nevertheless,
acquirors have been willing to pay substantial premiums for the shares of
target companies.2 Commentators have proposed a number of explana-
tions for mergers and tender offers at a premium over market price, in-
cluding the removal of inefficient managers, "synergy" gains from the
combination of two firms, inefficiencies in the capital markets, "empire
building," and tax benefits.2 The purpose of valuations of publicly held
companies, therefore, is to determine the difference between the market
price of a company's shares and the value of the shares in a transaction
where corporate control is being sold. 2
Fairness opinions serve two purposes. First, they assist and justify the
decisionmaking of directors. If a hostile acquiror makes a bid for a com-
pany, for example, the target's directors will often seek a fairness opinion
creased from one in 1975 to 36 in 1985. W.T. GRIMM & CO., MERGERSTAT REVIEW 1985, at 9
(1986).
16. See Greenhill, Structuring an Offer, 32 Bus. LAW. 1305, 1305-06 (1977) (discussing invest-
ment bankers' role in hostile tender offer).
17. See Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 124-27 (1979)
(describing investment bankers' role at meeting of target's directors).
18. Harris, Determining the Right Price to Pay, in HANDBOOK OF MERGERs, Ac.QuIsrroNs &
BuYotrs 149-51 (S. Lee & R. Colman eds. 1981).
19. See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549
(1984); Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383
(1970).
20. One study computed that the average premium in a successful tender offer (based on market
price two months prior to the offer's announcement) was 49%. Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and
the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 345 (1980). Statistics compiled by W.T. Grimm & Co.
show that the median premiums paid on public tender offers between 1980 and 1985 ranged from
28% and 45%, based on the closing market price for the company's stock five business days prior to
the announcement of the offer. W.T. GRIMM & Co., supra note 15, at 121.
21. See Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the
Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1163-75 (1984).
22. See Hazen, Premiums in the Sale of Corporate Control, 11 INST. ON SEC. REG. 317, 320
(1980) (valuation analysis determines size of "reasonable premium" for control).
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before recommending a course of action.2" A transaction's completion
sometimes is made contingent upon an investment banker's willingness to
provide a fairness opinion.24 The rendering of a fairness opinion does not
ensure, however, that the shareholders' interests will be protected. Invest-
ment bankers may have an incentive to craft their opinions in misleading
ways or to follow valuation techniques that predispose results.2 Similarly,
self-interested directors may "shop" for a compliant investment banker.2 6
The second use of fairness opinions is to persuade shareholders to
tender their shares or to approve the terms of a merger. Often, manage-
ment will include an opinion as to the adequacy of the offered price in
tender offer or proxy materials. 2 7 This representation by an investment
bank can have a substantial impact on the shareholders' decision.28 An
improperly prepared fairness opinion can cause shareholders to tender
their shares or to approve a merger that they would not otherwise
approve.29
The "fairness" of the consideration offered in a merger or tender offer
is both a legal and financial question."0 When rendering fairness opinions,
investment bankers evaluate the financial fairness of transactions, namely,
would a rational buyer and seller, assuming that each had knowledge of
relevant facts, purchase or sell the shares in question at the offered
23. See ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Guidelines for Directors: Planning for and Re-
sponding to Unsolicited Tender Offers, 41 Bus. LAw. 209, 218 (1985).
24. See Citadel's Refusal to Accept Salomon Fairness Opinion Leads to Lawsuit; Sudden Exit
for Citadel's Shuffling Director, CORP. CONTROL ALERT, Oct. 1985, at 1 (directors called off trans-
action when investment banker refused to give an opinion with same wording as required in merger
agreement).
25. For example, slightly different estimates of firm earnings or changes in the capitalization rate
applied to such earnings can produce significantly different results. See Fischel, The Appraisal Rem-
edy in Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 875, 890-93 (discussing uncertainties of
valuation).
26. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 9, at 72-74 (examining problem of opinion shopping
for third-party monitors).
27. See J. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR NEGOTIAT-
ING CORPORATE ACQUIsrrIONs 470 (1975) (recommending inclusion of fairness opinion in proxy
materials).
28. See, e.g., Denison Mines, Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 821 (D. Del. 1974)
(fairness opinion in proxy statement "added persuasive support" for transaction supported by man-
agement); Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 341 (Del. Ch. 1984) ("a primary purpose" of
fairness opinion "was to convince the stockholders . . . that the price offered was fair"); see also
Wander, Special Problems of Acquisition Disclosure: Investment Bankers' Reports and Conflicts of
Interest, 7 INST. ON SEc. REG. 157, 158 (1976) (reporting that fairness opinions can influence share-
holders' vote).
29. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), for example, Lehman Brothers
opined that $21 per share was a fair price in Signal Companies' cashout merger of UOP's minority
shareholders. Although Lehman's opinion was included in the proxy statement sent to UOP's share-
holders, the proxy did not disclose a valuation study prepared by Signal indicating the shares were
worth up to $24 each. Id. at 712. As the court noted: "Since this [information] would have meant over
$17,000,000 more to the minority, we cannot conclude that the shareholder vote was an informed
one." Id.
30. See Feuerstein, supra note 4, at 1337-38.
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price."1 Modern valuation techniques do not permit an investment banker
to determine whether a price is fair with absolute precision. A fair price is
not the highest value attainable for the firm or a single value but a range
of reasonable values.3 2 Investment bankers also may characterize transac-
tions in terms of "adequacy." Such an opinion can facilitate the adoption
of defensive tactics by the management of target firms. If, for example,
management wishes to resist a tender offer, and the investment banker
believes a higher price can be obtained, the banker might opine that the
offered price is inadequate, even though it is within the range of
fairness. 3
No federal or state law explicitly requires that investment bankers be
asked to render fairness opinions in corporate control transactions. In go-
ing-private transactions, however, Securities and Exchange Commission
Rule 13e-3-4 requires issuers to state whether the transaction is fair or
unfair to unaffiliated security holders and to disclose any fairness opinions
prepared by investment bankers.3 5 State fiduciary duty law requires that
directors consider some valuation information before acting on a transac-
tion,36 although Van Gorkom has left unsettled exactly what procedures
should be followed.3 7 A number of courts have held that directors can
31. See Nathan & Shapiro, Legal Standard of Fairness of Merger Terms Under Delaware Law,
2 DEL. J. CORP. L. 44, 48 (1977); see also Chazen, supra note 4, at 1443-50 (suggesting measures of
financial fairness in going-private transactions and arm's length mergers).
32. See Chazen, Friedman & Feuerstein, Premiums and Liquidation Values: Their Effect on the
Fairness of an Acquisition, 11 INST. ON SEC. REG. 143, 147 (1980) (investment banker simply gives
"judgment as to whether the deal is within the range that a sensible, prudent board would accept").
The possibility that other prospective purchasers or harder bargaining might result in a higher price
makes it impossible for an investment banker to opine that the offered price is the highest attainable.
See Chazen, supra note 4, at 1454.
33. See Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Ushers in Phase Six, 4
CARDOZO L. REV. 245, 256 (1983).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1985).
35. See SEC Schedule 13E-3, Items 8 & 9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1985). There are three
kinds of going-private transactions: (1) the second step in an acquisition that commenced in a tender
offer; (2) the elimination of the minority interest in an existing subsidiary of a public corporation; and
(3) a "pure" going-private transaction by which an insider takes a company private. See Brudney &
Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1356 (1978). Rule 13e-3
exempts second-step transactions occurring within one year of the earlier tender offer transaction if
the consideration offered in the second step is at least equal to the highest consideration offered in the
tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(g)(1) (1985). For a discussion of compliance with SEC Rule 13e-
3, see A. BORDEN, GOING PRIVATE §§ 10.01-12.21 (1982).
36. See Consolidated Amusement Co. v. Rugoff, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,584, at 94,484 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1978) (failure to consult investment banker one factor cited by
court in finding that stock issuance was improper defensive tactic); Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 202 Neb.
599, 277 N.W.2d 36 (1979) (holding directors who approved sale of company without obtaining
valuation personally liable for $2.5 million in damages); cf Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d
271, 307 n.15 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that
directors should have asked investment bankers to evaluate adequacy of tender offer), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
37. As the Van Gorkom court noted:
We do not imply that an outside valuation study is essential to support an informed business
judgment; nor do we state that fairness opinions by independent investment bankers are re-
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fulfill their fiduciary duty of care by relying in good faith on fairness
opinions,38 and leading attorneys advise that directors seek a fairness
opinion before acting on a merger or tender offer.39
B. The Promise of Fairness Opinions: Reducing Agency Costs
In the modern corporation, diversified shareholders entrust the opera-
tion of the firm to managers. But unless these managers also own the
firm, their interests will diverge from those of the shareholders.4 ° As a
result, shareholders incur agency costs,4 1 which include the costs of moni-
toring and restricting management behavior as well as the lost profits
caused by managers' opportunism.
4 2
Opportunistic behavior by managers is most likely during tender offers,
mergers and other transactions for corporate control. For example, man-
agers who believe that a successful takeover will lead to their replacement
may engage in defensive tactics,43 even if the takeover would be beneficial
quired as a matter of law. Often insiders familiar with the business of a going concern are in a
better position than are outsiders to gather relevant information; and under appropriate cir-
cumstances, such directors may be fully protected in relying in good faith upon the valuation
reports of their management.
488 A.2d at 876. The American Bar Association's Committee on Corporate Laws recommends that
directors consider:
the financial aspects of the offer, that is, ndt only the present and historical market value of the
corporation's shares and the premiums paid in other relevant transactions, but also the liquida-
tion and breakup values of the corporation's assets and component operations, where relevant,
the prospects of the corporation, and (to the extent estimable) its stock on a going-concern basis
over the next several years.
ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 23, at 218.
38. See cases cited infra note 74.
39. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 17, at 121-22.
40. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 116
(rev. ed. 1968) ("[W]here the bulk of the profits of enterprise are scheduled to go to owners who are
individuals other than those in control, the interests of the latter are as likely as not to be at variance
with those of ownership and . . . the controlling group is in a position to serve its own interests").
41. The term "agency costs" was introduced in Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Manage-
rial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECoN. 305, 308 (1976).
42. Mechanisms for monitoring managers include: (1) market controls (i.e., employment, product,
capital, and corporate control), see R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 16-20
(1978); (2) legal controls (e.g., fiduciary duties), see Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 702 (1982); (3) organizational controls (e.g., outside directors, ac-
countants, investment bankers), see Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L.
& ECON. 301, 312-15 (1983).
43. Fairness opinions can facilitate defensive tactics. Incumbent managers, faced with a merger
proposal from a hostile bidder, can refuse to approve the transaction until an investment banker is
consulted. This strategy is particularly effective after Van Gorkom. See supra notes 3-4 and accompa-
nying text. An investment banker's opinion that a transaction is unfair may then justify defensive
tactics. See cases cited infra note 74. A number of companies have proposed defensive charter amend-
ments requiring that fairness opinions be obtained before approval of control transactions. See, e.g.,
NATIONAL FUEL GAS Co., PROXY STATEMENT (Jan. 4, 1985) (charter amendment requiring inclu-
sion of fairness opinion in proxy materials soliciting shareholder approval of control transaction);
BRUNSWICK CORP., PROXY STATEMENT (Mar. 9, 1977) (charter amendment providing that terms of
business combination with "substantial" shareholder must be found fair by two independent invest-
ment banks).
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to shareholders."' Defensive tactics range from minor changes in the arti-
cles of incorporation to costly measures that can devastate a firm, such as
selling off valuable assets or repurchasing shares at a substantial pre-
mium.4" Conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders also oc-
cur on the acquiror's side of transactions. For example, managers may
pursue unprofitable acquisitions to enhance their compensation, prestige
and job security."' Moreover, when managers take firms private, their in-
terests conflict directly with those of the shareholders.
47
Fairness opinions rendered by investment bankers, if based on valua-
tions following accepted procedures, can reduce the agency problem inher-
ent in corporate control transactions. First, such opinions, like account-
ants' audits and lawyers' opinions, can serve a monitoring function for
shareholders."' Experienced investment bankers, because they are outsid-
ers with assets and reputations beyond the client firm and thus are more
difficult to corrupt than inside managers, increase the confidence of and
reduce the information costs to shareholders. Ideally, investment bankers
diligently investigate a transaction's fairness using accepted valuation tech-
niques and then offer their market reputations as "hostages" for the qual-
ity of their work.49 Second, fairness opinions can limit the discretion and
44. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1175 (1981) (managers have "substantial interest in preserv-
ing their company's independence and thus preserving their salaries and status"); Gilson, A Struc-
tural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 819, 825 (1981) ("management can reject offers beneficial to shareholders to retain emolu-
ments" of office).
45. For descriptions of the more common defensive tactics, see 1 A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS:
DEFENSES, RESPONSES & PLANNING 291-387 (1983 & Supp. 1985); 1 M. LIPToN & E. STEIN-
BERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOuTs 263-325 (1978).
46. See Mueller, A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers, 83 Q.J. EcoN. 643, 644 (1969); Note, The
Conflict Between Managers and Shareholders in Diversifying Acquisitions: A Portfolio Theory Ap-
proach, 88 YALE L.J. 1238, 1241-44 (1979). In a number of cases, shareholders in bidding firms
have experienced large declines in stock values after a takeover bid. During the 1970's, oil companies
were particularly poor acquirors. See Fisher, The Decade's Worst Mergers, FORTUNE, Apr. 30, 1984,
at 262, 263, 266.
47. Professors Brudney and Chirelstein have proposed that going-private transactions involving
management be prohibited, arguing that "the unavoidable suspicion is that the insiders will elect to go
private at a moment in time that they perceive as a turning point in the company's affairs-but before
that perception has become general. . . . The problem is compounded by the fact that, once a public
market for the company's securities, has been eliminated, no reliable basis remains for judging whether
the ousted stockholders were fairly compensated for their interest." Brudney & Chirelstein, supra
note 35, at 1368.
48. See Watts & Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some
Evidence, 26 J.L. & ECON. 613 (1983) (discussing historical importance of accountants' audit in
minimizing agency costs); Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pric-
ing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 288-93 (1984) (discussing role of lawyers' opinions in reducing shareholders'
costs of verifying information in business transactions).
49. Leading investment banks command premium fees for rendering fairness opinions; investors
trust the monitoring abilities of these investment banks and expect a bank's prospects for future pre-
miums to deter carelessness or corruption. Cf Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 613-21 (dis-
cussing role of investment banks as "reputational intermediaries" in initial public offerings). On the
hostage strategy as a private enforcement device, see Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hos-
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therefore the opportunistic behavior of managers.5" In a hostile tender of-
fer, for example, if the investment banker opines that a division of a firm
is worth at least $100 million, the directors could not grant a lock-up
option to a favored bidder for a lower amount. 51 In "freezeout" transac-
tions, fairness opinions make it more difficult for the persons in control of
an enterprise to deprive minority owners of a fair return on their
investment.
52
C. The Failure of Market and Legal Controls
Rather than reduce agency costs, fairness opinions can insulate manag-
ers from legal liability for actions taken in corporate control transactions.
Existing market and legal controls do not ensure that fairness opinions are
properly prepared by investment bankers or relied upon by directors.
5 3
1. Existing Market Controls
The threat of injury to an investment bank's reputation is not sufficient
to guarantee the quality of fairness opinions. In the absence of legal liabil-
ity, investment banks rarely pay a reputational penalty for poorly pre-
pared opinions. Shareholders cannot easily observe the quality of valua-
tions.54 At the same time, investment banks face strong incentives to
tages to Support Exchanges, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983).
50. In other corporate contexts, procedural mechanisms, such as special litigation committees, in-
dependent negotiating committees, and outside directors, are used to reduce management discretion.
For a discussion of the proceduralization of corporate governance, see Hertzel & Colling, Establishing
Procedural Fairness in Squeeze-Out Mergers After Weinberger v. UOP, 39 Bus. LAW. 1525,
1532-39 (1984).
51. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 279 (2d Cir.
1986) (decision to sell division for $70 million less than lowest estimate of firm's own investment
banker evidence of breach of directors' duty of care); MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings v. Revlon, Inc.,
501 A.2d 1239, 1249 (Del. Ch. 1985) (directors' decision to grant lock-up option at price $75 million
below lowest estimate of value provided by Revlon's own investment banker did not "withstand hard
analysis"), affd, 506 A.2d 185 (Del. 1986).
52. The terms "squeezeout," "cashout" or "takeout" are often used as synonyms for "freezeout."
A freezeout transaction usually involves the elimination of minority shareholders from the business
enterprise. For discussion of freezeout transactions, see F.H. O'NEIL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEIL'S
OPPRESSION OF MrNORrry SHAREHOLDERS §§ 5:01-5:36 (2d ed. 1985); Brudney & Chirelstein,
supra note 35, at 1357-76. Shareholders who dissent from a freezeout transaction may require the
corporation to purchase their shares at the "fair value" of the shares. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 262 (1983). On the limitations of the appraisal remedy, see Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares
in Mergers and Take-Overs, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 304-07 (1974).
53. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 275 (2d Cir.
1986) (court disapproved investment banker's "conclusory opinion"); Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482
A.2d 335, 344 (Del. Ch. 1984) (referring to "questionable methodology" and "quick and cursory"
analysis, court concluded that "both the opinions of Morgan Stanley and of Goldman, Sachs leave
something to be desired"); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983) (court critical of
"cursory preparation" of Lehman Brothers' fairness opinion).
54. In contrast, reputation is an effective signal when investment bankers underwrite securities.
After the fact, investors can easily observe the quality of new issues by comparing the issue price with
later market returns. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 619-20.
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provide opinions that serve management's interests.5" The investment
bank often has an ongoing relationship with management and has struc-
tured the deal it is supposed to judge.56
When investment banks structure deals, the bulk of their compensation
generally is contingent on the deal's success. 57 Thus, if an investment
bank both structures a deal and prepares a fairness opinion, the bank
faces a serious conflict of interest.58 By opining that a deal is fair, the
bank often stands to earn fees far in excess of the fee it has earned for the
fairness opinion. If an investment bank brings an acquisition candidate to
a firm, for example, the bank may have an incentive to overvalue the
acquisition candidate's future earnings, overestimate synergies between the
companies, and overlook problems in the board's financing plan.59
2. Existing Legal Controls
Under common law fraud, shareholders must demonstrate that directors
and investment bankers knowingly misrepresented the contents of a fair-
ness opinion to recover damages.6" Similarly, SEC Rule 10b-56 1 prohibits
55. In Weinberger, a partner in Lehman Brothers, who was also a director of UOP, coordinated
the investment bank's three-day review of UOP. One indication of Lehman's pliancy was the fact
that, when the opinion was drafted, the price was left blank. At some point, "[e]ither during or
immediately prior to the directors' meeting, the two-page 'fairness opinion letter' was typed in final
form and the price of $21 per share inserted." 457 A.2d at 707. Similarly, in the cashout merger of
Shell Oil by Royal Dutch, Morgan Stanley, hired by Royal Dutch, opined that the value of the
minority shares was $53 per share. But Goldman, Sachs, hired by a special committee of six outside
directors of Shell, valued the minority's shares at $80 to $85 per share. Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482
A.2d 335, 339 (Del. 1984).
56. See McGough, supra note 12, at 52 (reporting examples).
57. A typical agreement with an investment bank for providing services in a corporate control
transaction consists of a base fee and a contingent fee. See, e.g., Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302,
1315 n.19 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (describing First Boston's fee for representing Marathon Oil in takeover
by U.S. Steel). The bank generally will charge an additional flat fee for rendering a fairness opinion.
In some cases, the bank will receive additional fees if the opinion is publicly distributed. See, e.g.,
Anderson v. Boothe, 103 F.R.D. 430, 435 (D. Minn. 1984) (Salomon Brothers received $250,000 for
opinion and additional $150,000 once it was made public). In going-private transactions, the invest-
ment bank hired by the outside directors sometimes will receive a fee based on a percentage of the
amount paid to minority shareholders. See Shell: Bankers' Feud Fuels Parent-Child Rift, CORP.
CONTROL ALERT, May 1984, at 1, 4 (Goldman, Sachs received a fee of $2 million plus 0.67% of any
amount Royal Dutch paid over $55 per share in cashout of Shell). The purpose of such an arrange-
ment is to give the investment bank an incentive to achieve a higher price for the minority
shareholders.
58. See, e.g., Radol v. Thomas, 103 F.R.D. 430, 436 (D. Minn. 1984) ("a contingent fee arrange-
ment between a target company and its investment banker could have the potential to taint the fair-
ness opinion of the investment banker").
59. See, e.g., Baldwin Sues Merrill Lynch, Is Sued by SEC, Wall St. J., Sept. 27, 1985, at 8, col.
1 ($1.3 billion suit alleging that Merrill Lynch failed to disclose acquisition candidate's "true" finan-
cial prospects in fairness opinion).
60. See, e.g., Richardson v. White, Weld & Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,864, at 95,545 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1979) (liability may be imposed on investment banker
for conspiring with dishonest fiduciary in issuance of fairness opinion); Laventhol, Krekstein, Hor-
wath & Horwath v. Tuckman, 372 A.2d 168, 170 (Del. 1976) (accounting firm can be held liable for
knowing participation in directors' breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty during merger).
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fraudulent conduct in connection with the sale of a security, provided the
defendants act with the requisite scienter (or knowledge). 62 Tender offers
and going-private transactions are subject to antifraud rules comparable to
Rule 10b-5, except that the unlawful conduct need not occur in connection
with the sale of a security.63 The SEC's proxy regulations proscribe false
and misleading statements in proxy materials.6 In order to establish di-
rector or investment banker liability under the proxy regulations, share-
holders probably need to demonstrate scienter, although some courts have
suggested that negligence is sufficient against inside directors.6 5
Plaintiff shareholders rarely, if ever, can prove that directors and in-
vestment bankers acted with scienter.66 As a result, both common law
61. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985).
62. See, e.g., Helfant v. Louisiana & S. Life Ins. Co., 82 F.R.D. 53, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (allega-
tion that investment bank issued opinion contained in proxy knowing that representation of share
value was false stated claim under Rule IOb-5).
63. Section 14(e) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982), prohibits fraudulent and decep-
tive practices in connection with tender offers. Similarly, Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1985),
prohibits fraudulent and deceptive practices in connection with going-private transactions. See, e.g.,
Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1308-09 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (court dismissed Section 14(e) and
Rule 13e-3 claims, holding that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that fairness opinion contained in
tender offer materials was fraudulent). In an exchange offer, that is, an offer of securities rather than
cash, directors and investment bankers may be liable under Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act if a
misleading fairness opinion is contained in a registration statement. Ch. 38, § 11, 48 Stat. 74, 82
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982)). See generally McAtee, The Role of the Dealer
Manager in the Disclosure Process, 32 Bus. LAW. 1331 (1977) (discussing investment bankers' liabil-
ity under federal securities laws in tender offers).
64. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1985). Section 14(a) applies to any person, including a director,
who solicits or permits the use of his or her name to solicit any proxy. 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(a) (1982).
Investment bankers can only be sued as aiders and abettors under 14a-9. Mendell v. Greenberg,
[1985-86 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,218, at 91,611 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 1985).
The elements of a private cause of action for violation of Rule 14a-9 are: (1) that the proxy materials
contained a false or misleading statement of material fact; (2) that the proxy solicitation was an
essential link in effecting the proposed transaction; and (3) that the defendant acted with some level of
culpability. Halpern v. Armstrong, 491 F. Supp. 365, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
65. While the Supreme Court has imposed a scienter requirement in an action under Rule 10b-5,
see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the issue remains unresolved in Rule 14a-9
actions. Where the defendant is the corporation, negligence probably suffices. See Gould v. American-
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976). The Sixth Circuit, however, has held that
scienter must be established in a suit against an accountant under Rule lOb-5 and strongly suggested
that scienter be required in all 14a-9 suits. Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, 623 F.2d 422, 428-30
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980). Similarly, the Second Circuit, in a pre-Hochfelder
decision, intimated that scienter should apply to 14a-9 suits against outside directors. See Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300-01 (2d Cir. 1973). In 14a-9 suits aginst investment bank-
ers as aiders and abettors, scienter must be shown. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 91 (2d
Cir. 1983).
Courts have enjoined transactions for incomplete disclosure of the basis of a fairness opinion in
proxy materials. See, e.g., Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 268-69 (3d Cir.
1972) (failure to disclose that investment bankers relied on data supplied by management); Berkman
v. Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 787, 791-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (failure to disclose
investment banker's conflict of interest); Denison Mines, Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812,
822 (D. Del. 1974) ("bare reference of the Proxy Statement to an opinion of an independent invest-
ment [banking] firm that a transaction was 'fair to the company and its stockholders' without further
reference to the basis for that opinion was misleading").
66. See, e.g., Mendell v. Greenberg, [1985-86 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
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fraud and the federal securities laws do not provide sufficient deterrence
to ensure the proper preparation of fairness opinions. Stricter judicial
scrutiny of the reasonableness of directors' reliance on fairness opinions
and judicial recognition of the duty of investment bankers to act with care
when rendering opinions can serve two purposes. First, this approach will
discourage fraudulent behavior that now goes unpunished. Second, such
judicial action will deter ordinary negligence by directors and investment
bankers.
II. DIRECTORS' RELIANCE ON FAIRNESS OPINIONS
Directors should be able to fulfill their duty of care only by relying on
fairness opinions that are based on accepted valuation procedures. This
requirement, implied in Van Gorkom,6 7 will make directors more respon-
sive to shareholder interests in corporate control transactions.
A. The Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule
Directors have a fiduciary obligation to perform their duties with rea-
sonable care.68 The business judgment rule affords directors broad discre-
tion in devising business strategies. 69 The business judgment rule does not,
however, protect all director actions taken in the absence of fraud or
wrongdoing. Directors must act on an informed basis with due care and
diligence.7 0 When directors fail to act on an informed basis, their actions
92,218, at 91,611 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 1985) ("Drexel [Burnham Lambert Inc.] cannot be sued as an
aider and abettor [under Rule 14a-9], because plaintiff has failed to allege the requisite scienter.");
Associated Imports, Inc. v. ASG Indus., No. 5953 (Del. Ch. June 20, 1984) (LExS, States library,
Del. file) (court not satisfied banker "knowingly" aided and abetted in breach of directors' fiduciary
duty); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1348 (Del. Ch. 1981) ("Here, there is no evidence of
any understanding or overt combination between Signal, UOP and Lehman Brothers to shortchange
the interests of UOP's minority."), rev'd on other grounds, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). The Supreme
Court has explicitly left open the question whether reckless behavior could satisfy the scienter require-
ment under the federal securities laws. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12
(1976).
67. 488 A.2d at 877 ("directors were entitled to rely upon their chairman's opinion of value and
adequacy, provided that such opinion was reached on a sound basis") (emphasis added); see also
Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984) (directors' informed decision to reject tender offer
supported by "[v]aluation studies, carefully prepared by outsiders") (emphasis added).
68. While most states have adopted statutes establishing a director's duty of care, Delaware courts
imply this duty. See Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 503-05, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (Del. 1964).
69. Judge Winter argues that the business judgment rule serves several purposes. First, the rule
encourages competent persons to assume directorships. Second, the rule keeps courts from becoming
enmeshed in after-the-fact evaluations of corporate decisions. Third, the rule benefits diversified
shareholders by encouraging risk-taking by directors. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
70. The business judgment rule raises a rebuttable presumption in favor of the correctness of the
directors' decision; to succeed in challenging the directors' business judgment, the plaintiff sharehold-
ers must show that the directors had an interest in the transaction or that the decision was not made
in good faith after a reasonable investigation. Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d
Cir. 1980).
Investment Bankers' Fairness Opinions
may be enjoined; directors also may be personally liable to the corporation
or its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of their fiduciary
duty.7 1 The standard for determining whether a decision was informed is
gross negligence.7 2 In applying the gross negligence standard, courts look
to the extent of deliberation, the significance of the transaction to the fate
of the company, and the quality of the information, including expert ad-
vice, relied upon by the directors.
73
The business judgment rule ordinarily protects directors against charges
of breach of fiduciary duty when an investment banker's advice has been
obtained.74 The directors' reliance on such advice, however, must be rea-
sonable and in good faith. In other words, reliance is only one factor dem-
onstrating the directors' good faith or exercise of due care; it is not an
absolute defense. The directors still must consider the quality of the pro-
fessional's advice.
7 5
The application of the business judgment rule in corporate control
transactions has been widely criticized.78 The rule has been applied to
71. A recent amendment to the Delaware Corporation Law enables corporations to adopt charter
amendments limiting the personal liability of directors for monetary damages for duty of care viola-
tions. See 65 Del. Laws 289 (1986) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)) (effective
July 1, 1986). The Van Gorkom decision, in part, was responsible for this amendment. See Lewin,
Delaware Law Allows Less Director Liability, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1986, at Dl, col. 1. Such charter
provisions would have no effect on the availability of an injunction when directors breach their duty of
care. A number of other states that have recently amended their corporation laws, including New
York, have decided not to permit similar limitation of directors' personal liability. See 1986 N.Y.
Laws ch. 513, §§ 721-27.
72. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
73. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874-78 (Del. 1985); Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316
A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.) (directors sold oil reserves without updating valuation of price of oil), affd, 316
A.2d 619 (Del. 1974); Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,863, at 91,131 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976) (directors approved purchase of control-
ling interest in another company without obtaining pro forma financials).
74. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 384 (2d Cir. 1980) (defendant direc-
tors exercised reasonable judgment by engaging "an investment banking firm to help them to negotiate
and help them evaluate proposed mergers" and asking for pro forma balance sheets); Crouse-Hinds
Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that directors
acted in bad faith, and describing in detail defendants' discussion with and reliance upon financial
analyst); Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1134 (D. Nev. 1985) (preliminary
injunction against issuance of poison pill warrants denied, in part because directors relied on invest-
ment bankers); Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Sav. & Loan, 572 F. Supp. 1455, 1460 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (holding for defendant, court noted that since defendant had sought advice from representatives
of Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., his investigation was "reasonable"); Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411
F. Supp. 1210, 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (reliance on investment banker's report that offeror's price was
too low justified defensive tactics); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964)
(reasonable investigation shown by reliance upon investment banker's recommendation favoring stock
repurchase); Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556 (Del. Ch. 1977) (derivative suit alleging waste and
breach of fiduciary duty in purchase of stock from former director dismissed, in part on evidence that
defendants procured price estimates from two different financial analysts).
75. For a discussion of the limitations of the reliance defense, see Hawes & Sherrard, Reliance on
Advice of Counsel as a Defense in Corporate and Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REv. 1, 41-49 (1976).
76. See Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 44, at 1198-99; Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in
Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, 65 MICH. L. REv. 259, 274 (1966) (noting "incongruity
of applying a standard designed to vindicate the excercise of business judgment in non-conflict-of-
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"clothe directors, battling blindly to fight off a threat to their control, with
an almost irrebuttable presumption of sound business judgment, prevail-
ing over everything but the elusive hobgoblins of fraud, bad faith or abuse
of discretion."7 7 A number of courts have begun to examine directors' ac-
tions more carefully in such transactions, although a consistent method of
applying the business judgment rule has not been adopted.7 8 Stricter judi-
cial scrutiny of directors' reliance on fairness opinions is one possible ap-
proach to the agency problem inherent in corporate control transactions.
B. A Procedural Standard of Care
Courts risk encouraging management misconduct and "opinion shop-
ping" unless they require directors to monitor investment bankers. 9
When directors rely on fairness opinions, they should have the following
duties: (1) to select the investment banker with care; (2) to disclose accu-
rate information to the investment banker; (3) to determine whether the
investment banker followed accepted valuation procedures; and (4) to ex-
amine the investment banker's conclusions.
Directors should consider a number of factors to determine whether an
investment banker is competent to render a fairness opinion. The invest-
ment banker generally should have expertise in modern valuation tech-
niques and have experience preparing fairness opinions for reasonably
comparable transactions. 80 In going-private transactions involving man-
interest situations" when directors seek to retain control).
77. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 299 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
78. In Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), the Delaware Supreme Court strictly
applied the business judgment rule, stating that the determination of whether a business judgment is
an "informed one" in a cashout merger turned on "whether the directors have informed themselves
'prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them.'" Id. at
872 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), the court, after noting the "omnipresent specter that a board may be
acting in its own interests" in a takeover, id. at 954, held that "[ilf a defensive measure is to come
within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed."
Id. at 955. Finally, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986),
the court found that, once the directors proceeded on the assumption there would be a breakup of the
company, their "role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with
getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company." Id. at 182; see also Norlin Corp.
v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984) (issuance of new shares and creation of ESOP for
purpose of strengthening management control of company not entitled to broad protection of business
judgment rule); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 276 (2d Cir. 1986)
(suggesting that directors have "heightened duty of care" when approving lock-up) (emphasis in
original).
79. Stricter judicial scrutiny of directors' relationships with investment bankers is justified by the
absence of other legal controls. For example, the SEC carefully monitors accountants, and requires
directors to disclose "opinion shopping" in proxy materials. See Form 8-K, Item 4, 42 Fed. Reg.
4429, 4430 (1977); see also Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (1983) (accountant must be inde-
pendent "in fact"; non-audit ties between firm and client jeopardizes requisite independence).
80. Cf Hawes & Sherrard, supra note 75, at 20-28 (discussing selection of competent legal
counsel).
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agement and other freezeout transactions, the special negotiating commit-
tee of disinterested directors should be required to hire a disinterested in-
vestment banker to represent shareholder interests.81 Director reliance on
in-house valuations or on the fairness opinion of the investment banker
who structured the deal should be limited to arm's length transactions,
such as a merger negotiated between two independent firms. In all trans-
actions, directors should not enter into contingent fee arrangements that
impeach an investment banker's independence.82
As investment bankers often rely on financial information provided by
management in preparing fairness opinions, directors should be liable for
the disclosure of erroneous information due to their bad faith or negli-
gence.8" This rule will promote greater diligence and caution by directors
when they disclose information to investment bankers.
In a number of cases, courts have enjoined transactions in which direc-
tors relied on a poorly prepared fairness opinion.84 Courts have not, how-
81. In order to reduce the conflict of interest inherent in going-private transactions, directors often
establish a special committee of disinterested directors to evaluate the transaction. In most cases, this
committee hires a disinterested investment banker. See Friedman, Gordon & Brown, Representing the
Public Company in a Going-Private Transaction, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, GOING PRIVATE
1984, at 105, 108-112 (Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 453, 1984). The
SEC has considered requiring that two indepedent investment bankers evaluate the consideration of-
fered in going-private transactions, although such a regulation has not been adopted. See Notice of
Public Fact-Finding Investigation and Rulemaking Proceeding in the Matter of "Going Private"
Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, 40 Fed. Reg. 7947 (1975).
Courts or the SEC could require that directors only rely on fairness opinions prepared by disinter-
ested investment bankers in all transactions. Although this approach might eliminate some conflicts of
interest, it raises two problems. First, "disinterested" investment bankers may have received or hope to
recieve business from either the company or the original investment banker. Cf. Kraakman, Gatekeep-
ers, supra note 9, at 70-71 (discussing patronage as device for corrupting third-party monitors). Sec-
ond, the hiring of another investment banker would increase information costs. These costs include the
obvious cost of hiring a second investment banker, and the second banker's likely inability to prepare
an opinion as quickly as the investment banker who structured the deal. These increased information
costs are outweighed by the need for special procedural protections in going-private transactions. See
supra note 47.
82. Contractual agreements providing for contingent compensation in the event of improved or
white knight offers or use of the fairness opinion in a disclosure document do not impeach an invest-
ment banker's independence. 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 45, at 415-16.
83. See Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 341 (Del. Ch. 1984) (directors breached fiduciary
duty by failing to provide "essential information" on value of oil reserves to investment banker).
84. In Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986), the
Second Circuit held that the directors of SCM Corporation breached their duty of care by granting a
lock-up option to a white knight without making a diligent inquiry into the value of the optioned
assets or the value of the company as a whole. The directors, in a three-hour late-night meeting, were
apparently content with their investment banker's conclusory opinion that the price of the option was
within the range of fair value. The investment banker did not provide any financial data or a written
opinion. Had the directors inquired, they would have learned the banker did not even investigate the
range of fair value. Id. at 275. As the court held:
[D]irectors have some oversight obligations to become reasonably familiar with an opinion,
report, or other source of advice before becoming entitled to rely on it. . . . The proper exer-
cise of due care by a director in informing himself of material information and in overseeing
the outside advice on which he might appropriately rely is, of necessity, a pre-condition to
performing his ultimate duty of acting in good faith to protect the best interests of the
corporation.
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ever, articulated what constitutes a fairness opinion upon which directors
may rely. One court was critical of a fairness opinion prepared "virtually
overnight and without the necessary time and deliberation for a fair evalu-
ation . . . -.5 This Note proposes that directors be able to rely only on
fairness opinions that conform to accepted standards in the investment
banking industry.86 In an analogous context, courts have required direc-
tors to assure that accounting methods adhere to industry standards.
87
The requirement that the directors examine the investment banker's
conclusions as to a transaction's fairness is a reasonable one. There may
be cases where a transaction is plainly unfair, even though the fairness
opinion adheres to industry standards.88 Under the business judgment
rule, reliance on a properly prepared opinion is not in itself a complete
Id. at 275-76. But see id. at 290-91 (Kearse, J., dissenting) (business judgment rule precludes judicial
scrutiny of directors' good faith reliance on fairness opinion). In Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS
Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.), where a target company was enjoined from enforc-
ing a "poison pill" plan, the court was also critical of directors' reliance on a fairness opinion:
[Ilt is apparent that the insiders on the board . . . decided from the start to block the tender
offer, before its ramifications for shareholder welfare were considered; judgment first, trial
later, as the Queen of Hearts said in Alice in Wonderland. Smith Barney held itself out as a
blocker, and would have lost its $75,000 bonus if it had advised the board that the tender offer
was fair. . . .How the fairness of the tender offer could be determined without any consider-
ation of the fairness of the offer price is mystifying.
Id. at 257. Finally, in Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., No. 86-71332 (E.D. Mich. July 24, 1986), affld,
798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986), the district court enjoined a going-private transaction involving man-
agement, in part because the special committee of disinterested directors did not ask its investment
banker to determine a range of values for the company.
85. Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,863, at 91,139-40 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976); see also EAC Indus. v. Frantz Mfg., No. 8003 (Del.
Ch. June 28, 1985) (LExs, States library, Del. file) (enjoining the issuance of shares to ESOP, court
held that directors could not rely on "improvised" fairness opinion). Courts have been favorably dis-
posed towards fairness opinions based on thorough valuations. See, e.g., Tanzer v. International Gen.
Indus., 402 A.2d 382, 389 (Del. Ch. 1970) (price recommended by investment banker after visits to
target's plants, discussions with management, valuation of comparable publicly traded companies, re-
view of financial statements and other relevant factors was fair to minority in cashout merger).
86. The directors should not be strictly liable, however, when relying on a fairness opinion. If, for
example, the investment banker makes a computational error that is not reasonably discoverable by
the directors, the directors should escape liability. The benefits of strict liability (e.g., reduced enforce-
ment costs) are outweighed by the greater costs of compliance that such liability imposes on firms.
These compliance costs include compensating managers for bearing increased risk and the agency
costs resulting from managerial overdeterrence. See Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra
note 9, at 887. For discussion of accepted techniques for preparing fairness opinions, see infra notes
104-108 and accompanying text.
87. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 32, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (1981); Lippitt v.
Ashley, 89 Conn. 451, 465, 94 A. 995, 1000 (1915); see also ABA Committee on Corporate Laws,
Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595, 1608 (1978) ("corporate director should be
concerned with the establishment and maintenance of an effective [information] reporting system").
88. See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 610 (Del. Ch.) (court ignored procedural regularity
of transaction, noting that "[tihere are limits on the business judgment rule which fall short of inten-
tional or inferred fraudulent misconduct and which are based simply on gross inadequacy of price"),
afftd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
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and absolute defense. Directors still have an obligation to study indepen-
dently the facts of a transaction before making a decision. 9
III. INVESTMENT BANKERS' LIABILITY FOR FAIRNESS OPINIONS
Investment bankers will not consistently follow proper procedures if lia-
bility for poorly prepared fairness opinions is placed solely on directors.
Directors do not observe every act of their investment banker and there-
fore cannot require a given level of care. The imposition of liability also
will make investment bankers more vigilant in their role as third-party
monitors in corporate control transactions and make collusion between di-
rectors and bankers more difficult. Third-party monitoring is needed be-
cause director liability fails to ensure sufficient compliance with legal rules
at an acceptable cost.90
A. The Duty Owed by Investment Bankers
When an investment bank is retained to render a fairness opinion, the
contractual relationship should impose certain obligations on the bank,
one of which is a duty to exercise reasonable care in accordance with the
standards of the investment banking profession. 1 If the investment bank
fails to exercise the degree of care required, the bank should be liable to
either the client corporation, the client corporation's shareholders or both
for breach of contract or for negligence.
The cause of action available to the client corporation's shareholders
depends on how the fairness opinion was used. If the opinion was used to
persuade shareholders to tender their shares or to approve a merger,
shareholders should have both a derivative and direct action against the
bank. 2 In analogous circumstances, courts have held accountants directly
89. Investment bankers are sometimes no better equipped to form an opinion as to the fairness of
a transaction than are the directors, particularly in transactions involving companies with substantial
intangible assets, e.g., patents and trademarks, technological information and other proprietary
information.
90. There will be increased justification for investment banker liabilty if many corporations adopt
charter provisions limiting director liability for duty of care violations pursuant to D._ CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). Cf Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 9, at 888-90 (discussing
third-party monitoring as remedy for enforcement insufficiency).
91. Absent agreement, courts often supply a contractual term imposing a duty of "best" or "rea-
sonable" efforts on professionals. See, e.g., Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 810, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 194, 199 (1975) (maritime lawyer "must exercise the skill, prudence and diligence exercised by
other specialists of ordinary skill and capacity specializing in the same field"); Dantzler Lumber &
Export Co. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 115 Fla. 541, 547-48, 156 So. 116, 118 (1934) ("Public
accountants and auditors hold themselves out to be skilled and competent to perform the duties and
services which they undertake to perform as accountants and auditors and they are bound in law to
perform such services in an accurate and skillful manner.").
92. See generally W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
896-99 (5th ed. 1980) (discussing distinction between derivative and direct actions). The determina-
tion of whether a shareholder's suit is derivative or direct has important procedural consequences.
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liable for negligent misrepresentation to third parties such as
shareholders."
If, on the other hand, the fairness opinion was relied upon only by the
directors in their decisionmaking, the shareholders may be limited to a
derivative action on the client corporation's behalf.94 Courts could, how-
ever, interpret the contractual term "client of the investment bank" to in-
clude both the corporation and its shareholders even though the bank and
the shareholders are not in "privity" of contract. 5 This approach would
ensure that directors could not shift their duty of care to a party who does
not owe a similar duty to the shareholders.9
Derivative suits are subject to complex rules involving standing, security for expenses, demand on the
directors, and demand on the shareholders. See Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative
Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLuM. L. REV. 261, 309-15
(1981).
93. Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that a professional person is liable for
negligent misrepresentation when failing to excercise reasonable care in obtaining or communicating
information. This liability is limited to the loss suffered by those persons for whose benefit and guid-
ance the information is supplied, and to those third persons who the professional knows will be rely-
ing upon the information. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). See, e.g., Larsen v.
United Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 300 N.W.2d 281, 287 (Iowa 1981). Several courts have extended
accountants' liability to unknown but reasonably forseeable third parties who rely on negligently pre-
pared financial statements. See, e.g., Rosenblum v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 352, 461 A.2d 138, 153
(1983); International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal.
App. 1986). Investment bankers would owe a duty to shareholders either under Section 552 of the
Restatement or a liability to reasonably foreseeable third parties theory. For a discussion of account-
ants' liability to third parties, see Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third
Parties, 28 VAND. L. REv. 31, 67-87 (1975).
94. The investment banker arguably might owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders. This theory,
however, was rejected in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1348 (Del. Ch. 1981).
("[P]laintiff has offered no authority to indicate that an investment banking firm rendering a fairness
opinion as to the terms of a merger owes the same fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders as does
the majority shareholder."), rev'd on other grounds, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). But see Note, The
Standard of Care Required of an Investment Banker to Minority Shareholders in a Cash-out
Merger: Weinberger v. UOP, 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 98, 119 (1983) (arguing that investment bank
should owe fiduciary duty to shareholders when rendering fairness opinion).
95. This kind of categorization merely recognizes the intent of the corporation and investment
bank in entering the contract for the fairness opinion. Indeed, the Weinberger court noted that UOP
"retained the services of defendant Lehman Brothers for the purpose of rendering an opinion as to the
fairness of the price to be paid the minority for their shares." 426 A.2d at 1338. Similarly, in Joseph
v. Shell Oil Co., Royal Dutch hired Morgan Stanley "to prepare an estimate of the value of the
minority shares of Shell." 482 A.2d at 339.
96. In a withdrawn opinion in Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court narrowly construed the
contractual obligations of an investment bank in rendering a fairness opinion, holding that:
The contract obviously created a duty, including duty to the minority, but there is no basis for
liability in the present record . . . . Lehman Brothers was employed to render a fairness
opinion for the immediate benefit of the members of UOP's Board of Directors who were
scheduled to meet five days from the date of employment. The working team submitted its
report to the Board within the time alloted, thereupon fulfilling its duties and obligations
under the agreed upon contractual terms.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., No. 58,1981, slip op. at 3 (Del. Feb. 9, 1982), withdrawn, 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983). In dissent, Justice Duffy argued that "Lehman Brothers had a duty to excercise reasona-
ble care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information as to the value of the UOP
shares. . . ; any failure to perform in accordance with that standard would make Lehman Brothers
liable to the public shareholders for negligent misrepresentation." Id. at 7-8 (Duffy. J. dissenting).
On the Duffy dissent, see Deutsch, Weinberger v. UOP: Analysis of a Dissent, 6 CORP. L. REv. 29
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B. A Procedural Standard of Care
One argument against imposing liability on investment bankers for neg-
ligently prepared fairness opinions is that a workable standard of care
cannot be developed. Courts appear concerned that diffuse and potentially
costly duties will unduly burden investment bankers.97 Opponents of ex-
panded accountants' liability expressed similar fears.98 Over time, how-
ever, accountants have responded to increased legal liability by improving
their standards and techniques.99
In other corporate contexts, established practices frame workable legal
norms. For example, the "reasonable investigation" that underwriters
must perform prior to distributing securities pursuant to Section 11 of the
1933 Securities Act 00 has been honed into "model" verification proce-
dures.101 Courts have imposed Section 11 liability only for ignoring such
conventional procedures as examining corporate minutes and material
contracts.10 2 Similarly, an accountant's compliance with generally accepted
accounting standards is evidence of reasonable care.1 03 This approach of
consulting existing business conventions should be followed to determine
liability for fairness opinions.
Investment bankers have not established industry guidelines for render-
ing fairness opinions. Nevertheless, there are certain widely shared prac-
tices that can provide the basis for imposing liability. Almost without ex-
ception, investment bankers perform some derivation of discounted cash
flow (DCF) analysis, which calculates the net present value of the cash
flows generated from ownership of the business entity. 4 In conjunction
(1983). Prior to the Delaware Supreme Court's second opinion, plaintiff dismissed Lehman Brothers
from the action, thereby precluding consideration of an investment banker's obligation to minority
shareholders when rendering a fairness opinion. 457 A.2d at 703 n.3.
97. See Anderson v. Boothe, 103 F.R.D. 430, 441 (D. Minn. 1984); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
426 A.2d 1333, 1348 (Del. Ch. 1981).
98. In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170 (1931), Judge Cardozo argued:
"If liability for negligence [to third parties] exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder . . . may expose
accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class." Id. at 179.
99. See Mess, Accountants and the Common Law: Liability to Third Parties, 52 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 838, 855-57 (1977) (discussing positive impact of increased accountants' liability).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982).
101. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 9, at 83; see also Darrow & Sobel, Underwriters' Due
Diligence, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, MECHANICS OF UNDERWRITING 1983, at 423, 462-86
(Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 433, 1983) (listing over fifty discrete steps
in "reasonable" due diligence examination, beginning with check on issuer's credit and reputation and
concluding with site visits to issuer's major properties).
102. Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding investment
bankers, senior officers, outside directors, and accountant jointly and severally liable for investor losses
on misleading registration statement).
103. See SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 787-89 (9th Cir. 1979) (accountant's adher-
ence to generally accepted accounting standards held to discharge obligation).
104. See Saffer, Touching All Bases in Setting Merger Prices, MERGERS & AcQUIsrrToNs, Fall
1984, at 42; Harris, supra note 18, at 151-59. There are four basic steps in a DCF valuation: (1)
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with DCF analysis, most investment bankers use three other kinds of
analyses to prepare fairness opinions: evaluation of comparable acquisi-
tions, comparison with comparable companies and liquidation analysis.
10 5
The comparable acquisitions method of valuation entails an analysis of
the prices paid in transactions for companies comparable to the business
under consideration. 06 An examination of the financial ratios of compa-
nies comparable to the business being valued provides useful benchmark
data.10 7 A liquidation analysis is simply a valuation of the discrete units of
a business, assuming that the business will be sold in separate pieces
rather than as one unit. 08
Often, the reason a fairness opinion is poorly prepared is that the in-
vestment banker relied solely on one valuation technique.'0 9 If, for exam-
ple, an investment banker does not measure the liquidation value of a
business, and liquidation value is higher than going-concern value, the
fairness opinion may be flawed." 0 Similarly, when investment bankers
fail to consider comparable acquisitions, the fairness opinion may not ac-
curately reflect market demand. In a going-private transaction involving
management or a cashout merger, this omission might mean that share-
projection of the earnings and cash flow of the business for a period of five to ten years; (2) determi-
nation of the value of the business at the end of the projection period; (3) determination of the risk
characteristics of the business and the appropriate discount rate; and (4) the actual calculation of the
DCF values. See generally R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 70-78,
85-93, 164-78 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing mechanics of DCF valuation).
105. See Harris, supra note 18, at 150; Saffer, supra note 104, at 42-43; Bernstein, Considera-
tions in Rendering Fairness Opinions in Going Private Transactions, in PRACTISING LAW INSTI-
TuTE, GOING PRIVATE 1981, at 343, 345-46 (Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 370, 1981).
106. The comparable acquisitions method of valuation presumes that there is a "market" price
that will be paid for firms in a given industry. A company in a high growth industry, for example,
might be expected to command a higher price relative to its net income and book value than would a
company in a industry with slower growth rates in revenues and earnings. An analysis of comparable
acquisitions generally includes the purchase price in each transaction as a multiple of sales, net in-
come, book value and operating cash flow as well as premiums over market price. See Harris, supra
note 18, at 167-69; Saffer, supra note 104, at 43-45.
107. There are four types of financial ratios: leverage ratios, liquidity ratios, profitability or effi-
ciency ratios, and market value ratios. For discussion of the use of financial ratios in analyzing the
financial performance of companies, see R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 104, at 569-87; Har-
ris, supra note 18, at 159-67.
108. Liquidation analysis involves the valuation of the operating entities of the firm using DCF
analysis, comparable acquisitions and comparable companies. Corporate debt not assigned to any op-
erating division is subtracted at its market value. Investments (e.g., marketable securities, equity hold-
ings, joint ventures and real estate) are valued at market value and added to determine liquidation
value. Such analysis also should include the value of intangible assets such as patents and trademarks,
technological skills, subscriber lists and other proprietary information. Liquidation analysis is particu-
larly useful when the company being valued operates across several industries and/or has many hid-
den assets which do not appear on the books of the business.
109. See, e.g., Saffer, supra note 104, at 43-45 (discussing limits of DCF); Longstreth, Now
Private Citizen, Calls for Reform in Leveraged Buyouts, 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (CCH) 641, 641
(1984) (discussing failure to examine comparable acquisitions and liquidation).
110. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE
16-28 (2d ed. 1979).
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holders receive far less than what an outside party would pay for the
firm. 1
11
When applying these four valuation techniques, an investment banker
can make a number of errors. First, the investment banker might make a
purely computational error that affects the accuracy of the opinion. Sec-
ond, the investment banker could select a discount rate or financial ratio
that is unduly high or low for a firm in a particular industry. Third, the
financial projections might be too optimistic or pessimistic." 2 Finally, the
investment banker might fail to update existing valuation data." 3
The selection of discount rates, financial ratios and financial projec-
tions, although a subjective process, is governed by certain rules." 4 Courts
should require that investment bankers justify the selection of such values
when they are not within a reasonable range. Similarly, investment bank-
ers should have some responsibility to examine the reasonableness and
accuracy of financial information used in opinions.'"
Courts should impose liability on investment bankers when a fairness
opinion has not been based on a valuation conforming to accepted stan-
dards in the investment banking industry. In making this determination,
courts should engage in a fact-finding process similar to that followed in
cases involving accountants' negligence."" The definition of what consti-
tutes an acceptable valuation should be broad. In general, liability should
be imposed when investment bankers do not properly follow all four ac-
cepted valuation techniques. There may be cases, however, where invest-
ment bankers can reasonably justify the use of only some of these tech-
niques."17 Courts also must recognize that the development of valuation
techniques is not a static process, and that more advanced techniques will
become widely accepted in the future.""
111. See Saffer, supra note 104, at 43-44.
112. On the problems of error and bias in financial projections, see R. BREALEY & S. MEYERS,
supra note 104, at 222-24.
113. See Chazen, supra note 4, at 1463-65 (discussing importance of timing in rendering fairness
opinions).
114. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 104, at 173-78 (discount rates), 569-80 (financial
ratios), 224-34 (financial projections); Harris, supra note 18, at 151-59.
115. See Feuerstein, supra note 4, at 1339 (defining "reasonable investigation").
116. See Fiflis, supra note 93, at 62-87.
117. See Harris, supra note 18, at 150 (discussing usefulness of different valuation procedures).
118. See, e.g., Ross, The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing, 13 J. ECON. THEORY 341
(1976) (proposing new model for measuring expected returns on assets).
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IV. STRICTER JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF FAIRNESS OPINIONS
IN PRACTICE
A. Directors' Reliance
Stricter judicial scrutiny of directors' reliance on fairness opinions will
not be costless. An increase in the likelihood that directors will be sued
and held personally liable for damages could reduce the number of value-
increasing corporate control transactions.' 19 When directors do enter into
such transactions, they may overinvest in information and follow time-
consuming procedures.1 "'
These possible costs are outweighed by important benefits. First, in-
creased judicial scrutiny will improve the quality of fairness opinions.
Fairness opinions of high quality will in turn reduce directors' opportu-
nism both in pursuing and opposing transactions. For example, such opin-
ions can deter directors from making acquisitions that increase firm size
but not profits, and provide protection to minority shareholders in such
freezeout transactions as a leveraged buyout involving management or a
cashout merger of a subsidiary by the parent corporation. Similarly, care-
fully prepared opinions can prevent the directors of target firms from
adopting costly defensive tactics that stop value-increasing transactions.
The absence of a large market for shares makes fairness opinions of qual-
ity particularly beneficial in transactions involving closely held
corporations.
B. Investment Bankers' Liability
If investment bankers are liable for negligent fairness opinions, they are
likely to demand indemnification or charge large risk premiums.' 21 Even
if investment bankers are indemnified, however, liability will encourage
them to render opinions with greater diligence. First, corporations proba-
bly will not fully indemnify investment bankers122 and some may not in-
119. Corporate directors cannot diversify the value of their human capital and thus have a ten-
dency to avoid risk. If directors are sued whenever a corporate control transaction turns out poorly,
they will have an incentive to avoid such transactions. The ability of directors to shift their personal
risks through indemnification or insurance, however, reduces this agency problem. See Kraakman,
Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 9, at 864-67. Similar protection is provided by charter
provisions limiting director liability for duty of care violations. See supra note 71.
120. See Fischel, supra note 7, at 1446-47 (arguing that fairness opinions do not presently pro-
vide valuable information to directors). Once investment bankers face liability, however, the informa-
tional benefits of fairness opinions should increase.
121. See Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 9, at 892.
122. Investment bankers typically are indemnified when rendering fairness opinions. The extent
of such indemnification, however, is an important point of negotiation between the company and its
investment bank. Often, the engagement letter does not provide for indemnification when the invest-
ment banker is negligent. See 2 M. LivroN & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOTrrs C-18
(2d ed. 1984) (sample indemnification agreement).
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demnify them at all.12 Second, if investment bankers are indemnified,
those with reputations for rendering quality opinions will be most in de-
mand. In other words, liability will improve market controls on invest-
ment bankers.
124
Legal liability may strengthen the market position of the leading invest-
ment banks. Since these firms have established reputations and sophisti-
cated staffs, there should be increased demand for their services. The lead-
ing investment banks are more likely to render impartial opinions than




Fairness opinions rendered by investment bankers play an important
role in the process and documentation of corporate decisionmaking.
Stricter judicial scrutiny of fairness opinions will promote development of
more uniform, higher-quality valuation procedures and thus reduce man-
agement opportunism in corporate control transactions. Courts should
confine their review of the quality of fairness opinions to whether direc-
tors and investment bankers follow proper procedures.12  This kind of
limited review is within judicial competence and would not unduly burden
directors and investment bankers.
123. Cf Globus v. Law Research Serv., 418 F.2d 1276, 1287-89 (2d Cir. 1969) (denying indem-
nification to investment banker for Section 11 liability), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). Insurance
against Section 11 liability is available for directors, accountants and lawyers. However, underwriter
insurance has not been available since 1973. Banhoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets and
Shelf Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REv. 135, 181 n.220 (1984).
124. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 9, at 96-100 (discussing limits of reputational
controls).
125. See id. at 69-72 (discussing corruption of third-party monitors).
126. For example, if courts routinely evaluated the fairness of the price contained in the opinion,
directors and investment bankers would have to meet an unreasonable standard of care. There might
be rare cases, however, where a transaction is plainly unfair, even though the fairness opinion con-
forms to accepted standards. In such cases, courts should not permit directors to rely on the fairness
opinion. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
